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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
THOMAS KEVIN ROTHLISBERGER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030494-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARGUMENT 
I. ADAIR'S TESTIMONY WAS 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
The State argues in its brief that Chief Adair's testimony was nothing more than lay 
testimony under UT. R. EVID. 701. See, Brief of Appellee at pp. 13-18. First, the State cites 
to a 1987 Utah Supreme Court case1 that indicates ". . .that witnesses who testify about 
matters that may be subject to scientific analysis are not necessarily expert witnesses under 
Rule 702." Id. at pp. 13-14. UT. R. EVID. 702 clearly indicates that a witness qualified as 
an expert may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise through their own "...scientific, 
technical or other specialized knowledge" (emphasis added). Appellant's argument that 
Adair testified as an expert witness was not under the assumption that the testimony was 
1
 State v. Ellis. 748 P.2d 188 (Utah 1987). 
"scientific" but that it was within the "specialized knowledge" of Chief Adair. See, Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 16-19. 
The State inaccurately endeavors to convince this Court that Appellant's reliance upon 
U.S. v. McDonald2 is misplaced stating that".. McDonald is readily distinguishable because 
the defendant objected to the testimony, not because it was opinion testimony, but because 
he claimed it was so-called 'profile9 evidence that improperly invaded the province of the 
jury.. .[and].. .because it does not address the question of whether such testimony, although 
admissible through an expert, may also be admitted through a lay fact witness, such as Chief 
Adair." Brief of Appellee at p. 17. The State mistakenly focuses on the fact pattern of 
McDonald, instead of looking to its reliance upon in the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision on this issue under United States v. Muldrow, 19F.3d 1332,1338 (10th Cir.). Todeem 
Adair's testimony as admissible as a "lay fact witness" would require undermining not only 
Muldrow. but nearly all of the federal circuits' determinations on the issue. 
Nearly all of the federal circuits have recognized that law enforcement testimony 
regarding opinions or conclusions pertaining to drug trafficking activities require 
"specialized knowledge," as dictated under FED. R. EVID. 702 and replicated under UT. R. 
EVID. 702 regarding expert testimony. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has long recognized 
the expert nature of law enforcement officers' testimony when they give their opinions or 
2
 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir.), cert, denied., 502 U.S. 897, 112 S.Ct. 270, 116 
L.Ed.2d 222 (1991). 
2 
conclusions regarding drug trafficking activities3. The recognition, as plainly articulated by the 
9 Circuit Court of Appeals, is that testimony regarding such matters calls upon specialized 
knowledge and does not relate "to matters 'common enough' to qualify as lay opinion 
testimony." United States v. Figueroa-Lopez. 125 F.3d 1241, 1246 (9th Cir.1997), cert, 
denied, 523 U.S. 1131, 118 S.Ct. 1823, 140 L.Ed.2d 959 (1998). It is well-recognized 
throughout the United States that expert testimony on the operations of drug dealers, or drug 
trafficking, is appropriate because these matters are not within the common knowledge of the 
average juror4. 
3
 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz-Zappatta. 131 F.3d 152,1997 WL 731790, at *3 (10th 
Cir. Nov. 25,1997) (table) (Officer gave expert testimony "regarding the purposes for which 
drug dealers bring guns to drug transactions"); United States v. Peach. 113 F.3d 1247,1997 WL 
282867, at *3-4 (10th Cir. May 28,1997) (table) (Detective "testified as an expert witness on 
crack cocaine sales and the differences between crack cocaine users, user-dealers, and dealers"), 
cert, denied, 522 U.S. 974,118 S.Ct. 428,139 L.Ed.2d 329 (1997); United States v. Ouintana, 70 
F.3d 1167,1170-71 (10th Cir.1995) (Detective testified as an expert in explaining the drug 
jargon *608 used in wiretap evidence); United States v. Muldrow. 19 F.3d 1332,1338 (10th Cir.) 
(Officer with "specialized knowledge" gained from education, training and experience in the 
investigation of drug trafficking offenses testified as an expert about "drug trafficking in the 
community, amounts of cocaine sold on the streets, the prices of cocaine," what qualifies as a 
large amount of cocaine, the dangers in transporting large amounts of drugs, and whether a 
particular amount was intended for distribution or personal use), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 862,115 
S.Ct. 175,130 L.Ed.2d 110 (1994); United States v. Garcia. 994 F.2d 1499,1506 (10th 
Cir.l993).(Agent qualified to testify as an expert on the value of methamphetamine labs and an 
operator's desire to protect the lab through the use of firearms); United States v. Harris. 903 F.2d 
770, 775- 76 (10th Cir. 1990) (FBI agent testified as an expert about whether documents "had 
characteristics consistent with records of a drug business"). 
4
 United States v. Bonev. 977 F.2d 624, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1997\: T Inited States v. Romero. 
57 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir.l995)(Explanations of drug packaging and whether amounts tended 
were consistent with personal consumption are subjects about which an average juror may not 
know); see also United States v. Tavlor. 18 F.3d 55, 60 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 512 U.S. 1226, 
114 S.Ct. 2720,129 L.Ed.2d 845 (1994); United States v. Muldrow. 19 F.3d 1332,1338 (10th 
Cir.) (specialized knowledge of law enforcement officer assisted jury in understanding the 
significance of the amount omitted); United States v. Lennick. 18 F.3d 814 (9th Cir.)(The length 
3 
The State's reliance upon its 1987 Utah Supreme Court case and several others outside 
this jurisdiction to determine that Adair's testimony is lay witness testimony under UT. R. 
EviD. 701 is obviously misplaced. Nearly all of the cases cited by the State in support of 
their argument predate the federal cases cited herein in footnotes "3" and "4" above. 
Additionally, these cases retain no authority in this jurisdiction, and each are separately 
distinguishable in that they do not pertain to the "specialized knowledge" surrounding drug 
trafficking. Brief of Appellee at pp. 13-14. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals and other 
federal circuits have undertaken this analysis and have found the "specialized knowledge5' 
surrounding drug trafficking to be governed by FED. R. EviD. 702, which is replicated under 
UT. R. EVID. 702. 
The State then argues that Adair's testimony was admissible testimony by citing to 
cases involving analyses of opinion testimony. Brief of Appellee at pp. 15-17. This 
misconstrues Appellant's argument, however, by mistakenly leading this Court to believe 
Appellant is arguing the "admissibility" of Adair's testimony. Appellant did not challenge 
Adair's testimony as being inadmissible because he was offering opinion testimony, but 
challenged it based on lack of proper notification of an expert witness under UTAH CODE 
ANN. §77-17-13 and UT. R. CRIM. P. 16. 
of time it takes to grow a marijuana plant, the amount of marijuana it takes to make a cigarette 
and the amount of marijuana one could obtain from a single plant are matters that are likely to be 
outside the scope of most jurors' common knowledge and are properly within the realm of expert 
testimony), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 856,115 S.Ct. 162,130 L.Ed.2d 100 (1994); United States v. 
Hunter. 95 F.3d 14, 17 (8th Cir.l996)(f,Expert testimony that a certain quantity of drugs suggests 
distribution is admissible.") (citation omitted). 
4 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has undeniably held that testimony on the 
significance ofanamount ofillegal substance is specialized. U.S.v.Muldrow. 19F.3dl332, 
1338 (C.A.10 designates(Kan.),1994). InMuldrow. the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that since the officer testified concerning only his specialized knowledge, and did not go 
outside his specialized knowledge by opining about the defendant's intent, then his testimony 
was properly admitted as expert testimony. Id. (emphasis added). Adair's testimony 
regarding his specialized knowledge of drug trafficking is what designates it as "expert" 
testimony. Id. 
n. APPELLANT ADEQUATELY PRESERVED 
HIS ARGUMENT ON THE 
VIOLATION OF UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 
The State argues in a footnote to their brief that (a) UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 governs 
over UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 since it deals specifically with the requirements for disclosure of expert 
testimony, and (b) Appellant did not properly preserve his argument regarding the violation of UT. 
R. CRIM. P. 16 at trial and it can only be addressed by a showing of plain error, which Appellant has 
not shown. Brief of Appellee at p. 11, fn. 3. The State's arguments fail since Appellant's argument 
was properly preserved at the trial on this matter and is properly challenged on appeal herein5. 
5
 The State's argument that Appellant would be required to show plain error to have this 
issue addressed is also misplaced. The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that "[w]hen a 
party fails to preserve an issue for appeal, an appellate court will review the issue if the appealing 
party can demonstrate plain error or exceptional circumstances; party may also assert ineffective 
assistance of counsel in failing to preserve the issue." State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 114, f21, fh. 2, 
61 P.3d 1062. Appellant believes this argument was fully preserved at trial; however, if it were 
found to not be so, it would be an obvious case of ineffectiveness of counsel for failing to do so. 
As articulated in the argument, it is clear that a violation of Rule 16 occurred through the 
State's failure to disclose inculpatory evidence. In Appellant's opening brief, Appellant 
5 
A violation of UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 occurs when a party wrongfully fails to disclose inculpatory 
evidence. State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 921 (Utah 1987). In State v. Perez, 2002 UT App. 211, 
52 P.3d 451, this Court determined that the failure to disclose the anticipated testimony of a law 
enforcement expert witness was a clear violation of UT. R. CRIM. P. 16. It is apparent that cases such 
as the instant one are proper in challenging that a violation of UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 occurred when the 
State fails to disclose inculpatory evidence, as occurred here. 
UT. R. CRIM. P. 16 governs discovery in criminal matters and, as argued in Appellant's 
opening brief and above, requires the State to produce inculpatory evidence upon request and comply 
fully and forthrightly. Brief of Appellant at pp. 19-21. Co-defendant's trial counsel, William L. 
Schultz, initially made the objection to Adair's testimony and Appellant's trial counsel joined in the 
objection. Tr. at pp. 104-107. Schultz not only objected based upon the fact that Adair was not 
listed on the witness list as an expert, but also based on the fact that there was no notification that 
Adair, whether designated an expert or not, was going to express any opinion as to distributional 
amounts of drugs. Id at p. 106. 
If evidence is disclosed under Rule 16, the prosecutor has a continuing obligation to disclose 
newly acquired information so as to avoid misleading the defense. State v. Kallia 877 P.2d 138,143 
(Utah 1994). At the preliminary hearing, the State elicited testimony that a combination of the drugs 
challenged his trial counsel's ineffectiveness on the limited basis of failure to request a 
continuance as a remedy when the statute clearly indicated this as a remedy. Along those same 
lines, if Appellant's trial counsel requested the remedy of a Rule 16 violation, but this Court 
finds that a specific articulation of an objection under Rule 16 is required, Appellant's trial 
counsel's performance once again fell below an objective standard of reasonableness by failing to 
so articulate. If Appellant's counsel was ineffective in this manner, prejudice occurred in barring 
Appellant from challenging the matter on appeal. Hence, both prongs of the Strickland v. 
Washington test are satisfied. 466 U.S. 668,104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). 
6 
and the drug paraphernalia indicated that it was for distribution. Sometime between the preliminary 
hearing and the trial, the State determined that it should elicit more specific and precise information 
from Chief Adair regarding the significance of the amount of drugs found, the street price for such 
drugs and other aspects of drug trafficking. The State failed to disclose this additional testimony to 
Appellant. Schultz objected when the testimony was offered, specifically addressing the failure to 
disclose the evidence, and Appellant's trial counsel joined in the objection. Appellant's Rule 16 
violation argument was adequately preserved below and should be considered by this Court. 
III. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. 77-17-13 REGARDING ADAIR'S TRIAL 
TESTIMONY WERE NOT MET BY EBERLING'S 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY 
The State argues that Appellant received proper notification of Adair's expert testimony 
through Officer Eberling' s testimony at the preliminary hearing held in this matter. Brief of Appellee 
at pp. 18-21. The State first relies upon a 1985 Utah Supreme Court case6 pertaining to the 
substitution of one alibi witness for another. Id. at p. 19. This case is easily distinguishable since 
alibi witnesses are not "expert" witnesses with "specialized knowledge." Obviously if two witnesses 
can testify to the same circumstance creating an alibi for the defendant, then it would not be unfair 
surprise to substitute one for the other. "Specialized knowledge," however, is personal and based 
upon extensive background and experience. 
The State then points to a non-controlling case from the District of Columbia Court of 
Appeals7. Brief of Appellee at pp. 19-20. In this case, the State argues that the "defendant claimed 
6
 State v. Ortiz, 712 P.2d 218 (Utah 1985). 
7
 Reed v. U.S., 828 A.2d 159 (D.C. App. 2003) 
7 
the substitution of new expert violated the state notice statute/9 and that "the trial court 
rejected this challenge." Id. An actual reading of this case indicates that the defendant only 
made general objections to the expert's qualifications at trial and, on appeal, challenged the 
trial court's finding that the expert was qualified. Reed at 163. The D.C. appellate court 
found that the government substantially complied with the notification rule, but it was based 
not only upon the government's timely letter to defense counsel notifying them of the 
substance of the testimony, but also presentation of the witness's curriculum vitae prior to 
voir dire. This case is obviously distinguishable from the instant case since there was no 
notification whatsoever of Adair's expert testimony, either in the form of a letter or 
presentation of a curriculum vitae8. 
The State attempts to circumvent the notice requirements of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-
17-13(1 )(a) by stating that Eberling' s testimony at the preliminary hearing was substantively 
identical to Adair's testimony at trial. In essence, the State is arguing the alternative notice 
provisions of §77-17-13(5)(a), which indicate as follows: 
For purposes of this section, testimony of an expert at a preliminary hearing 
held pursuant to Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure constitutes 
notice of the expert, the expert's qualifications, and a report of the expert's 
8
 In the case of an expert witness, in which qualifications go to both admissibility and 
weight, a curriculum vitae is material information by which the opposing party's counsel can 
challenge the expert's qualifications and credibility. Seivewright v. State, 7 P.3d 24 (Wyo. 
2000). The purpose of a curriculum vitae is to allow the opposing party the opportunity to view 
that particular expert's qualifications and plan to rebut those, if the opposing party chooses to do 
so. Qualifications lend to a question of witness credibility of the expert, which is a question to be 
debated and ultimately decided by the trial court and jury. 
8 
proposed trial testimony as to the subject matter testified to by the expert at the 
preliminary hearing. 
The State's argument fails, however, for several reasons articulated below. 
First, Eberling's testimony at the preliminary hearing was not identical to that offered 
by Adair at trial and challenged on appeal by Appellant. The State misquotes Eberling's 
testimony stating that Eberling testified that 'the amount seized from the car in which 
defendant was riding - nearly 32 grams - was many times the amount needed for personal 
use." Brief of Appellee at p. 20. This testimony simply does not exist in the preliminary 
hearing transcripts and was fabricated by the State in a feeble attempt to support their 
inadequate argument. Transcripts of Preliminary Hearing at pp. 18-19. 
Eberling testified that the amount for personal use was "small, small amount in a small 
bag." Id He also testified that the quantity found in the passenger door was "saleable," and 
with the scales and baggies he believed it to be for distribution. Id. "Saleable" simply infers 
that something is able or fit to be sold and is not indicative of either an intent or amount. 
Merriam-Webster's Online Dictionary, "saleable," at www.m-w.com, March 12, 2004. 
Eberling's testimony at the preliminaiy hearing indicates that he believed it was for 
distribution when coupled with the paraphernalia found in co-defendant, Althoff s gym bag 
claimed by her and found in the backseat of the vehicle. 
As for Eberling's trial testimony, cited by the State, it is supportive of the idea that 
Eberling could not have offered the same testimony elicited from Adair at trial. The colloquy 
at trial between Eberling and Appellant's trial counsel was as follows: 
9 
Q. I believe, if I can go back, Exhibit No. 1 right here was what you found on the 
console, right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That was with a small amount? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Is that a characteristic amount of what's sold? 
A. Yes. 
Q. It is. What - I mean you testified you believed it was for sale 
(inaudible). Do you know how many (inaudible)? 
A. I don't--
Q. Is that just one? 
A, I have no idea. 
Tr. at p. 64. Eberling appears to be testifying that he is not aware of the significance of the 
amount of the drugs found in the console, just that it can be sold. However, it is axiomatic 
that any amount of drugs can be sold. This officer's testimony does not point to the 
specialized knowledge offered at trial by Adair, who is the chief of police. 
Adair's trial testimony was clear and precise based upon his specialized knowledge. 
Adair testified that personal use amounts are usually packaged in "quarter or half 
grams...maybe even at the most a gram." Tr. at p. 90. He went on to testify that, depending 
on the quality, a quarter of a gram usually costs around $40 or $50 in Monticello and that 
"some really good crystal" can cost $100 for a half a gram. Id. at pp. 91-92. Adair also 
testified that he had seen the kinds of baggies found in the gym bag when he has previously 
found methamphetamine and that "usually people that have quantities of drugs have scales." 
M a t p. 92. 
Adair's testimony differs significantly from that of Eberling's testimony at the 
preliminary hearing. Eberling did not offer clear and precise testimony at the preliminary 
10 
hearing and, when coupled with his testimony at trial, it is questionable whether he even 
could have offer the type of testimony elicited from Adair at trial. It is not reasonable to 
assume that Eberling's testimony--that a drug is "saleable" and for distribution when coupled 
with the apparent distribution paraphernalia- could have reasonably placed Appellant on 
notice that Adair would be testifying to the significance of the amount of drugs found, the 
street price for such drugs and other aspects of drug trafficking. 
Second, the State's argument that Eberling's testimony reasonably put Appellant on 
notice of Adair's trial testimony is flawed simply because Eberling is not Adair and Adair 
is not Eberling. This Court undertook an analysis of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 recently 
in State v. Tolano. 2001 UT App. 37, f 18, 19 P.3d 400 and determined as follows: 
. , .section 77-17-13 clearly contemplates that the expert take the stand and 
provide live testimony because such a provision would enable a party "to 
adequately prepare to meet adverse expert testimony." Arellano, 964 P.2d at 
1170. Specifically, when an expert testifies at a preliminary hearing, the 
adverse party is able to obtain "the name and address of the expert, the expert's 
curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report." Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-
13(l)(b) (1999). In addition, the opportunity to cross examine the expert 
witness enables a party to elicit much more information than the mere notice 
requirements of section 77-17- 13. Therefore, we conclude that the 1999 
amendment to section 77-17-13 did not overrule Arellano, and an expert must 
provide live testimony at the preliminary hearing to satisfy the alternate 
notice provision of Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-13(5)(a) (1999). [FN4] 
FN4. Our conclusion is also supported by the plain language of 
subsection (5)(b), which states: "Upon request, the party who 
called the expert at the preliminary hearing shall provide the 
opposing party with a copy of the expert's curriculum vitae as 
soon as practicable prior to trial or any hearing at which the 
expert may be called as an expert witness." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-17-13(5)(b) (1999) (emphasis added). As only a witness. . 
11 
.may be called, it is clear that the expert(s) must take the 
stand at the preliminary hearing in order to satisfy the 
notice requirements of section 77-17-13. 
Adair took the stand at the preliminary hearing, but did not offer testimony as to the 
significance of the amount of drugs or the uses of the drug paraphernalia found. Had the 
State elicited this testimony from him during the preliminary hearing, Appellant's trial 
counsel would have had the opportunity to obtain "the name and address of the expert, the 
expert's curriculum vitae, and a copy of the expert's report" (UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-
13(l)(b)), and elicit much more information under cross-examination than the mere notice 
requirements of §77-17-13. Tolano at f 18. Since this testimony was not elicited from Adair 
until he was on the stand testifying at the trial, Appellant never obtained the information 
under §77-17-13(l)(b) and was not given the opportunity to explore the testimony and the 
witness more thoroughly prior to trial. 
IV. THE STATE FAILS TO SATISFY 
ITS BURDEN TO SHOW THAT THE 
ERROR WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL 
The State argues that "[e]ven assuming the trial court abused its discretion in 
admitting Chief Adair's testimony, defendant cannot show substantial prejudice." Brief of 
Appellee at p. 21. The State relies upon State v. Hopkins9 to indicate that the burden of 
showing prejudice is on Appellant. Id. However, Hopkins was not a case of violation of 
either UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 or UT. R. CRIM. P. 16, but rather a challenge that the 
91999 UT 98,1J20, n.3, 989 P.2d 1065. 
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prosecution failed to deliver requested discovery items prior to the preliminary hearing. The 
Utah Supreme Court found that Hopkins ".. .failed to demonstrate how he could have plausibly 
defeated state's case for probable cause to bind him over for trial," specifically setting forth the 
"[p]urpose of preliminary hearing is to decide whether there is probable cause to bind over for trial." 
Hopkins at f20. Hopkins is readily distinguishable from the instant case for this reason. 
Whether an undisclosed expert witness is challenged under a violation of UT. R. CRIM. 
P. 16 or UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13, the burden of showing that prejudice did not occur 
falls upon the prosecution. Where the error consists of the failure of the prosecution to 
provide a defendant with evidence in violation of UT. R. CRIM. P. 16, the burden is on the 
State to persuade the court that the error did not unfairly prejudice the defendant. State v. 
Martin. 1999 UT 72, \ 14, 984 P.2d 975, citing State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 
1987). Similarly, this Court shifted the burden to the State regarding a violation of the notice 
provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-17-13 to show that the error did not unfairly prejudice 
the defendant. State v. Tolano. 2000 UT App 37,1J14, 19 P.3d 400. 
Under either violation, the State must show that, despite the errors, the outcome of the 
trial merits confidence and there is no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for 
the defendant. Knight at 921; Tolano at f 14, citing State v. Arellano. 964 P.2d 1167, 1170 
(Utah App. 1998). Because of the difficulties posed by the record's silence in cases 
involving a wrongful failure to disclose evidence, when the defendant can make a credible 
argument that the prosecutor's errors have impaired the defense, the State must persuade the 
13 
court that the error was harmless. Knight at 921. Since the State mistakenly focuses on the 
idea that Appellant has failed to show substantial prejudice, the State fails to even address 
its burden at all. Brief of Appellee at pp. 21-22. As argued in Appellant's opening brief, the 
failure to disclose Adair's inculpatory expert testimony was prejudicial to Appellant, 
resulting in a violation of Appellant's right to a fair trial. Brief of Appellant at pp. 26-27. 
V. THE EVIDENCE 
WAS INSUFFICIENT 
The State argues that Appellant's reliance upon State v. Lavman. 953 P.2d 782 (Utah 
App. 1998) is misplaced since the drugs in that case were "discovered in a bag tucked into 
the waistband of a passenger in the vehicle and the State produced no evidence that 
defendant was even aware of the bag." Brief of Appellee at p. 26. The State goes on to argue 
that, although affirmed on certiorari by the Utah Supreme Court10, the analysis contained in 
Lavman I was not adopted since the Utah Supreme Court found the alternate reasonable 
hypothesis analysis "problematic and unnecessary." 
The State bases its argument on the fact that the Utah Supreme Court disapproved of 
a mechanical reliance on a list of factors amounting to a checklist, and found those factors 
to be only relevant considerations in making the underlying determination. Brief of Appellee 
at pp. 26-28. Ironically, the State itself takes issue with only one factor discussed in 
Appellant's opening brief- the alternate reasonable hypothesis analysis - and contends that 
State v. Lavman. 1999 UT 79,985 P.2d 911. 
14 
Appellant's argument fails based completely on that one factor. Id. It is clear that the State 
incorrectly analyzed Layman I and Lavman II. 
Layman II did not overrule Layman L but rather affirmed it. While Layman II did take 
issue with the alternate reasonable hypothesis analysis in and of itself, it did not completely 
overrule its consideration altogether. The Utah Supreme Court articulated its determination 
when it stated as follows: 
There is nothing wrong with a succeeding court considering factors that were 
considered relevant by an appellate court analyzing a factually- similar context. 
But both trial and appellate courts need to be mindful that no such list is 
exhaustive, and that listed factors are only considerations. The final legal test 
is the most generally-worded one: here, whether there was a sufficient nexus 
between the defendant and the drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual 
inference that the defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control 
over the drugs or paraphernalia. See Fox, 709 P.2d at 318. 
Lavman II. at 115. 
Appellant's argument was not on one specific factor as the State would contend. 
Appellant discussed six (6) separate factors in his opening brief as relevant items to be 
considered by this Court in making its ultimate determination; to wit: (1) the circumstantial 
evidence failed to sufficiently exclude the alternative hypothesis; (2) Appellant's admitted 
use of methamphetamine earlier that day cannot support a conclusion of possession; (3) 
actual knowledge and location in vehicle does not prove possession; (4) a jury is not allowed 
to indulge in inference upon inference that could lead but to conjecture; (5) the State must 
prove case beyond a reasonable doubt; and (6) the jury cannot discredit Tonya's testimony 
15 
and replace it with its belief as to truth of evidence not in the record. Brief of Appellant at 
pp. 30-39. These factors all lead to an analysis pertaining to the "sufficient nexus" set forth 
by the Utah Supreme Court in Layman II. These six (6) factors lead to a conclusion that 
there was not a sufficient nexus between Appellant and the drugs or paraphernalia to permit 
a factual inference that Appellant had the power and the intent to exercise control over the 
drugs or paraphernalia. Layman II. at 115. 
VI. THE PROSECUTOR 
MISSTATED THE LAW 
The State argues that, "even assuming the prosecutor's remarks were in some way 
inaccurate, the jury instructions, which neither party objected to accurately state the 
applicable law." Brief of Appellee at p. 31. The State relies upon State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 
475 (Utah 1989), which it analyzes as stating that "any impropriety resulting from 
prosecutor's closing-argument remarks was rendered harmless by court's jury instructions." 
Id. A reading of Hopkins does not resolve to this conclusion. 
In Hopkins, the defense obj ected to the prosecutor's misstatement of law in his closing 
arguments. Rather than overruling the objection, as the trial court did in the instant case, the 
Hopkins court specifically undertook a colloquy with the jury to ensure that the misstatement 
did not mislead them. Specifically it stated as follows: 
I would indicate to the jury that you have heard the Court read the law to you, that 
you are aware of what the instructions are as far as the law is concerned. And you are 
to apply those instructions not to statements or argument that the counsel makes, but 
apply the law that the Court has indicated to you to the facts in the case. If it's in 
conflict of what they said, you will apply it as the Court has said. 
16 
Hopkins at 478-479. The Hopkins court did not just assume that the jury had the appropriate 
instructions, but went further to instruct them as to what they should apply should the 
instructions conflict with the prosecutor's closing remarks. 
The State asks this Court to determine that, if the prosecutor's remarks misstated the 
law, the jury should just know to rely upon the jury instructions rather than his misstatements. 
The trial court in the instant did not take further precautions by specifically instructing the 
jury on his misstatements, but simply overruled Appellant's objection. As argued in 
Appellant's opening brief, the State's misstatement of the law in closing at trial in this matter 
called to the attention of the jury a matter it would not be justified in considering in 
determining its verdict, and the error was substantial and prejudicial. Statev.Longshaw. 961 
P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1998), citing State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah App. 
l992)(quoting State v. Peters. 796 P.2d 708, 712 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 853 P.2d 
897 (Utah 1993); accord State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329,335 (Utah 1991); State v. Bovatt 854 
P.2d 50, 554-555 (Utah App.), cert denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993). 
[The remainder of this page left intentionally blank] 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the trial court's Judgment. 
DATED this 15th day of March, 2004. 
Barton J. Warren 
Attorney for Thomas Kevin Rothlisberger 
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prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Reply Brief to: 
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Nov. 25, 1997. 
following a jury trial. [FN1] Both 
Ramos-Fernandez and Diaz- Zappatta were 
convicted on one count of conspiracy to possess 
with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 846, and on one count of possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Additionally, 
Diaz-Zappatta was convicted on a second count of 
possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and on two 
counts of carrying a firearm during and in relation 
to a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c)(1). On appeal, Ramos-Fernandez contends 
that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction for conspiracy. Diaz-Zappatta contends 
that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions for carrying a firearm during a drug 
trafficking crime. We affirm the convictions of 
both defendants. 
FN1. Because these two appeals involve 
the same underlying facts and testimony, 
we have companioned them for our 
consideration. 
Before ANDERSON, TACHA and BALDOCK, 
Circuit Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*] 
FN* This order and judgment is not 
binding precedent, except under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 
and collateral estoppel. The court 
generally disfavors the citation of orders 
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and 
judgment may be cited under the terms and 
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
**1 After examining the briefs and appellate 
record, this panel has determined unanimously that 
oral argument would not materially assist the 
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore 
ordered submitted without oral argument. 
Codefendants Ulises Ramos-Fernandez and Jose 
Diaz-Zappatta appeal from their convictions 
BACKGROUND 
Based on information that unnamed persons were 
dealing crack cocaine out of an apartment located at 
436 Louisiana S.E., Apt. 15, Albuquerque, New 
Mexico ("apartment 15"), Albuquerque police 
obtained and executed a search warrant for that 
address on June 29, 1995. When they arrived, the 
apartment door was open. Identifying themselves, 
the officers entered and immediately saw four men 
who were sitting on sofas in the living room. The 
officers ordered the men to stand up. According to 
the officers' trial testimony, when defendant Jose 
Diaz-Zappatta stood up, there was a loaded 
handgun on top of the sofa cushion exactly where 
he had been sitting. Although the gun had been 
hidden by Diaz-Zappatta's body while he sat, once 
he stood, it was plainly visible. [FN2] R. Vol. Ill 
at 76-77, 79-80, 83, 98, 143. Detective Sallee, 
who was recognized as an expert in the area of 
narcotics investigations, testified that a person 
would carry a weapon in the vicinity of a drug 
transaction to protect the drug deal. Id. at 83. 
According to Sallee, "it's very common for one of 
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the individuals involved in the deal to bring a 
weapon for protection of either his money or his 
drugs." Id Sallee further testified that only 
Diaz-Zappatta had access to the gun. Id "No one 
could get [the handgun] but Mr. Diaz because he 
was seated directly on top of it." Id 
FN2. Officer Sallee testified as follows 
regarding the handgun: 
A: When I had Mr. Diaz stand up, I 
immediately noticed that there was a 
handgun right under where he was seated. 
Q: Now, what do you mean by under? 
A: He was sitting on top of it. It was on 
top of the cushion of the couch, and he was 
directly on top of the hand gun. 
Q: So was his body, when he stood up and 
before he stood up, in direct physical 
contact or contact with this weapon? 
A: Yes, it was. 
Q: There was no cushion, no pillow, 
anything? 
A: There was nothing in between him and 
the gun. 
R. Vol. Ill at 76-77. 
As the living room occupants were being secured, 
two officers entered the back bedroom, where they 
encountered Ramos-Fernandez and Lorenzo 
Hernandez. The first officer observed Hernandez 
drop a bag containing crack cocaine, and he also 
observed a large amount of money on the bed. Id 
164-65, 86. During the ensuing search, the officers 
took pagers from both Ramos-Fernandez and 
Hernandez, and they found an envelope addressed 
to Ramos-Fernandez at apartment 15. Id. at 121, 
127, 166-67. 
**2 At that time, the officers arrested 
Ramos-Fernandez because he lived at the apartment 
and was in the back room with the drugs. [FN3] R. 
Vol. Ill at 90. They arrested Diaz-Zappatta 
because he was in charge of the firearm, and they 
arrested Hernandez because he was in the bedroom 
with the crack cocaine. See id. At a later date, 
Cesar Cuba-Garcia was arrested. Eventually a 
federal grand jury returned a superseding 
indictment which charged all four men with various 
drug crimes, [FN4] and which also charged 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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Diaz-Zappatta with carrying a firearm during and in 
relation to drug trafficking crimes. R. Vol. I, Tab 
60. 
FN3. One of the officers testified that they 
concluded Ramos- Fernandez lived at 
apartment 15 because of the envelope 
addressed to him at the address, and also 
because Ramos-Fernandez told another 
officer that he resided there. R. Vol. Ill at 
105-06. Ramos-Fernandez's counsel 
asked questions which suggested that the 
testifying officer had insufficient personal 
information to support the conclusion that 
Ramos-Fernandez lived at apartment 15, 
but he made no hearsay objection. 
FN4. The jury acquitted Cuba-Garcia on 
all counts. 
Hernandez entered into a plea agreement. At trial, 
Hernandez testified that he began dealing drugs in 
February 1995. R. Vol. Ill at 184-86. His first 
contact was with Diaz-Zappatta and Cuba-Garcia, 
and thereafter, he generally purchased the drugs 
from Diaz-Zappatta. Id at 185-86, 190. However, 
when Diaz-Zappatta was not available, Hernandez 
also purchased from Ramos-Fernandez on two or 
three occasions and from Cuba-Garcia on two or 
three occasions. Id. at 192. Responding to a 
specific question about where his purchases from 
Ramos-Fernandez took place, Hernandez answered, 
"There at his house," in apparent reference to 
apartment 15. Mat 222. 
According to Hernandez, Diaz-Zappatta, 
Ramos-Fernandez, and Cuba-Garcia were dealing 
drugs together at apartment 15, id at 191-92, and 
they would talk about "the rocks, the money, and 
the drugs." Id at 201. Although Diaz- Zappatta 
appeared to be the one in charge, it was 
Ramos-Fernandez who would contact Hernandez by 
calling his pager. Id at 192, 194. During the 
period that he was buying drugs from the 
codefendants, Hernandez was making about $2,000 
profit a month by reselling on the street. Id at 195. 
Generally, his transactions with his codefendants 
occurred in the same way as the transaction on June 
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29, 1995. Id at 190, 200, 207, 240. Thus, on the 
day that police executed the warrant, he had gone to 
the apartment to buy drugs which belonged to 
Diaz-Zappatta and Ramos-Fernandez. Id. at 197. 
On entry, he had greeted Diaz-Zappatta and then 
gone to see Ramos-Fernandez as usual. Id. at 200. 
When the police arrived, Hernandez was in the 
process of counting out the money. Id. at 196-97. 
Diaz-Zappatta also testified. Diaz-Zappatta denied 
any personal involvement in any drug dealing, and 
claimed that he was merely waiting for 
Ramos-Fernandez to give him a ride on the day that 
he was arrested. Diaz-Zappatta also denied any 
knowledge that a drug deal was proceeding between 
Ramos-Fernandez and Hernandez, and he further 
disputed the testimony that he had been sitting on a 
gun. According to Diaz-Zappatta, the police were 
not telling the truth when they said that there was a 
gun underneath him. R. Vol. IV at 369. 
DISCUSSION 
Both Ramos-Fernandez and Diaz-Zappatta contend 
that the evidence is insufficient to support their 
convictions on certain counts. Whether the 
evidence is sufficient to support a conviction is a 
question of law which we review de novo. United 
States v. Dashney, 117 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th 
Cir.1997). Viewing the evidence-both direct and 
circumstantial, together with the reasonable 
inferences drawn therefirom-in the light most 
favorable to the government, we must determine 
whether " 'any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. In answering this question, we 
may neither weigh conflicting evidence nor 
consider the credibility of witnesses'." United 
States v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 1107, 1108 (10th 
Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Pappert, 112 
F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir.1997) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Voss, 
82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 
117S.Ct.226(1996). 
A. Ramos-Fernandez 
**3 Ramos-Fernandez contends that the testimony 
is not sufficient to establish the existence of a 
conspiracy during the times alleged in the 
conspiracy count. He complains that, except for 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 
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the date of his arrest, the government presented no 
evidence as to the dates of his alleged involvement 
in any conspiracy. Thus, he argues that "it would 
be an impermissible stretch of credulity to believe 
that Hernandez's testimony must relate to the times 
alleged in the Indictment." Appellant's Br. at 12. 
We disagree. 
To obtain a conviction for conspiracy, the 
government must prove " '[1] that two or more 
persons agreed to violate the law, [2] that the 
Defendant knew at least the essential objectives of 
the conspiracy, ... [3] that the Defendant knowingly 
and voluntarily became a part of it, and [4] that the 
alleged coconspirators were interdependent.' " 
United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1285 (10th Cir.) 
(quoting United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 66S 
(10th Cir.1992)), cert, denied, 117 S.Ct. 253 (1996). 
In this case, the indictment charges that the 
conspiracy existed from at least April 1995 until 
September 1995. R. Vol. I, Tab 60, Count One at 
If 1. In relation to Ramos-Fernandez, the 
indictment specifically charges overt acts related to 
the June 29, 1995, search and arrests. Id. at % 3. 
Clearly, Hernandez's testimony provided ample 
evidence from which the jury could have found the 
essential elements of Ramos-Fernandez's 
involvement in a conspiracy to violate drug laws on 
June 29, 1995. Moreover, taking the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the government, a 
reasonable juror could have found that 
Ramos-Fernandez had been engaged in similar acts 
over a course of months which spanned the larger 
period charged in the indictment. [FN5] 
Accordingly, we affirm his conviction. 
FN5. Even if this were not the case, a 
"variance between an indictment and the 
proof may be disregarded if it does not 
affect an essential element of the offense 
so as to impair substantial rights of the 
defendant." United States v. Smith, 838 
F.2d 436, 440 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(citations omitted). 
B. Diaz-Zappatta 
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Diaz-Zappatta does not appeal his convictions on 
the drug charges. Rather, he contends only that the 
officers' testimony that he was seated on top of the 
gun is insufficient to support his conviction for 
carrying a weapon during and in relation to a drug 
transaction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). 
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically 
defined "carry" under § 924, it has given some 
guidance which assists our considerations. Thus, 
"a firearm can be carried without being used, e.g., 
when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing 
throughout a drug transaction." Bailey v. United 
States, 116 S.Ct. 501, 507 (1995). Consistent with 
Bailey, to obtain a conviction under the "carry" 
prong of § 924(c)(1), the government must prove 
that the defendant possessed the firearm through 
dominion and control, and that he transported or 
moved it. United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1564, 
1568 (10th Cir.1996). 
Clearly the officer's testimony that Diaz-Zappatta 
was sitting directly on top of the gun, thereby giving 
him ready access to it, supports a finding that he 
possessed the gun through dominion and control. 
Nonetheless, Diaz-Zappatta complains that there 
was no evidence linking his possession to the drug 
transaction. In particular, he notes that nothing in 
Hernandez's testimony concerned guns. The 
argument ignores the officer's expert testimony 
regarding the purposes for which drug dealers bring 
guns to drug transactions. The fact that a drug 
transaction was occurring, in the open room 
immediately next to where Diaz-Zappatta sat, is 
sufficient to support a reasonable juror's inference 
that the gun was related to the drug offense. 
Moreover, in reviewing for sufficiency of the 
evidence, we " 'presume a nexus between a firearm 
and a drug trafficking offense when an individual 
with ready access to a firearm is involved in such an 
offense.' " [FN6] United States v. Baker, 30 F.3d 
1278, 1280 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting United States 
v. Coslet, 987 F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir.1993)). 
FN6. As we noted in Baker: 
The "nexus presumption" language used in 
our cases in no way changes the 
government's burden at trial to prove every 
element of a § 924(c)(1) offense.... [T]he 
"nexus presumption" language is merely a 
Page 4 
tool of appellate review by which this 
court judges whether the evidence 
introduced at trial, with its accompanying 
inferences and viewed in the light most 
favorable to the government, is sufficient 
to permit a reasonable jury to find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Baker, 30 F.3d at 1280 n. 1. 
**4 Finally, Diaz-Zappatta contends that, even if 
there were a gun underneath him on the sofa, there 
is no evidence that he carried it. Again, viewing 
the record in the light most favorable to the 
government, we note the evidence that 
Diaz-Zappatta was sitting directly on top of the gun. 
Although there is no direct evidence that 
Diaz-Zappatta placed the gun beneath him in a way 
that both hid it and made it readily accessible, the 
circumstantial evidence is substantial. That is, in 
this case, only Diaz-Zappatta had access to the gun. 
From that circumstance, a reasonable juror could 
infer that Diaz- Zappatta transported and placed the 
gun on the sofa, exactly where he sat. [FN7] 
FN7. That Diaz-Zappatta was the only 
person with access to, and control over, the 
gun readily distinguishes his case from 
United States v. Smith, 82 F.3d 1564 (10th 
Cir.1996), which involved a handgun 
found on the bedroom dresser of a 
defendant who was convicted of 
possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1). In Smith, we rejected the 
government's assertion "that at some 
unknown time, [the defendant] moved the 
weapon from some unknown previous 
location to the dresser where it was found." 
Id at 1568. Finding that there was no 
evidence supporting that inference, we 
noted that several persons had access to 
the firearm and the dresser. Thus, we 
concluded that "we can only speculate 
whether defendant Smith, or any one of the 
several other persons in the house, during 
and in relation to the drug trafficking 
offense, moved the firearms or placed 
them where they were found during the 
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search." Id By contrast, in this case, the 
evidence demonstrated that the gun was 
located in direct contact with Diaz-
Zappatta's body, underneath him, where no 
one else could access it. 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we AFFIRM 
the judgment of the district court. 
131 F.3d 152 (Table), 1997 WL 731790 (10th 
Cir.(N.M.)), 97 CJ C.A.R. 3002 Unpublished 
Disposition 
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United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Michael C. PEACH, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 96-3233. 
May 28, 1997. 
Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit 
Judges. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*] 
FN* This order and judgment is not 
binding precedent except under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata 
and collateral estoppel. The court 
generally disfavors the citation of orders 
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and 
judgment may be cited under the terms and 
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 
**1 After examining the briefs and appellate 
record, this panel has determined unanimously that 
oral argument would not materially assist the 
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore 
ordered submitted without oral argument. 
Mr. Michael C. Peach appeals from his convictions 
and sentences on two counts of possession with 
intent to distribute crack cocaine, two counts of 
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using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to 
a drug trafficking offense, and one count of 
unlawful and wilful obstruction of commerce by 
robbery. 
On December 18, 1994, Wichita Police Officer 
Patrick M. Chapman stopped the vehicle driven by 
Mr. Peach for making a lefthand turn without 
signaling. Officer Chapman then approached the 
driver's side of the vehicle and asked Mr. Peach for 
his driver's license. As Mr. Peach reached for his 
driver's license, Officer Chapman observed the tip 
of a plastic baggie between Mr. Peach's legs which 
Officer Chapman believed contained crack cocaine. 
When a second officer arrived on the scene, Officer 
Chapman asked Mr. Peach to exit his vehicle. 
When Mr. Peach did so, he left the plastic baggie 
on the driver's seat of the vehicle. The second 
office then placed Mr. Peach under arrest. 
An inventory search of the vehicle revealed a 
loaded Titan Model 380 handgun underneath the 
driver's seat and a pager which repeatedly "went 
off' during the search. Analysis of the contents of 
the plastic baggie revealed it contained 1.41 grams 
of crack cocaine. 
On February 7, 1995, two officers of the Wichita 
Police Department on routine patrol observed a 
vehicle driven by a black male traveling southbound 
on Broadway at a high rate of speed. The officers 
observed the vehicle's front windshield was cracked 
and decided to stop the vehicle. 
As the officers exited their patrol car, the driver of 
the detained vehicle, Mr. Peach, got out of his 
vehicle. The officers told Mr. Peach to get back 
into his vehicle. However, Mr. Peach turned and 
ran from the scene. During the ensuing chase, the 
pursuing officer observed Mr. Peach place his right 
hand on what the officer believed to be the butt on a 
handgun and drop the weapon on the ground. 
When the officer finally tackled Mr. Peach, he 
observed Mr. Peach trying to stuff a plastic baggie 
into his mouth. The officers then retrieved the 
plastic baggie, which contained eight "rocks" of 
crack cocaine weighing 1.19 grams, and a loaded .9 
mm. Ruger P 89 handgun. The officers also 
recovered a dark colored pager and $168 from Mr. 
Peach's person. An inventory search of the vehicle 
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revealed a registration card indicating Mr. Peach 
had recently purchased the vehicle and a pink pager. 
On April 103 1995, a black male entered Jimmie's 
Diner at 3111 N. Rock Road, Wichita, Kansas, with 
a handgun and demanded money while holding a 
hostage around the neck with the handgun jammed 
into her ribs. The robber obtained approximately 
$300 in cash and change from the cash register in a 
maroon bank bag. He then fled in a blue Ford 
Taurus. 
**2 Officers responding to the robbery call noticed 
a vehicle fitting the description of the robber's 
vehicle traveling westbound on 32nd Street and 
gave chase. The officers eventually stopped the 
vehicle and took both occupants of the vehicle to 
the scene of the robbery for identification. The 
hostage, an employee of Jimmie's Diner, identified 
Mr. Peach as the robber. 
On the ground near where the vehicle stopped, 
officers found a Marksman BB gun pistol and 
brown pants turned inside out with $202 in cash in 
the pockets, which was separated by denomination. 
In the vehicle, officers found rolled coins and fifty 
wrapped $1 bills along with a maroon bank bag 
belonging to Jimmie's Diner. 
On April 19, 1995, the grand jury returned a 
five-count indictment against Mr. Peach. Counts I 
and III charged Mr, Peach with possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine base (crack cocaine), in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994) and 18 
U.S.C. § 2 (1994), on December 18, 1994, and 
February 7, 1995, respectively. Counts II and IV 
charged him with unlawfully carrying or using a 
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
offense, namely possession of crack cocaine with 
intent to distribute, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
924(c) and 2 (1994), on December 18, 1994, and 
February 7, 1995, respectively. Count V charged 
him with unlawfully, knowingly and willfully 
obstructing, delaying, and affecting commerce and 
attempting to obstruct, delay, and affect commerce 
by robbing Jimmie's Diner on April 10, 1995, by 
means of actual and threatened violence, force, and 
fear of injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 and 
2(1994). 
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Prior to trial, the district court denied Mr. Peach's 
motion to dismiss Count V, but granted his motion 
to sever Count V from the remaining counts. On 
October 18, 1995, Mr. Peach proceeded to trial on 
Counts I through IV. A jury convicted him on all 
four counts on October 19, 1995. 
On January 17, 1996, as a result of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Bailey v. United States, 116 
S.Ct. 501 (1995), the district court granted Mr. 
Peach a new trial on Count II, using or carrying a 
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking 
offense. The district court denied Mr. Peach's 
motion for a new trial on Counts I, III, and IV. The 
court then sentenced Mr. Peach to thirty-six months 
imprisonment on Counts I and III, to run 
concurrently, and sixty months imprisonment on 
Count IV, to run consecutively to his sentences for 
Counts I and III. 
On March 19-20, 1996, Mr. Peach was retried on 
Count II and found guilty. On April 3, 1996, the 
district court denied Mr. Peach's renewed motion 
for acquittal. 
On May 21, 1996, Mr. Peach was tried on Count 
V. The jury convicted him on May 22, 1996. 
On June 17, 1996, the district court sentenced Mr. 
Peach to twenty years imprisonment on Count II 
and sixty-three months imprisonment on Count V, 
both sentences to run consecutively to his prior 
sentences. 
On appeal, Mr. Peach contends: (1) in his first 
trial, the district court erred in allowing Detective 
Fettke to testify as an expert on drug dealers and 
regarding a conversation Detective Fettke had with 
him in December 1994; (2) the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain his convictions on Counts I 
and III; (3) the district court erred in failing to give 
a jury instruction on aiding and abetting as charged 
in the indictment in Counts I through IV; and (4) 
the district court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute 
him on Count V. [FN 1] 
FN1. In his reply brief, Mr. Peach asserts 
for the first time the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him on Count V and 
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that the district court erred in giving an 
aiding and abetting instruction on Count V. 
We will not address these issues, however, 
because issues raised for the first time in 
the reply brief are deemed waived and will 
not be considered. See Codner v. United 
States, 17 F.3d 1331, 1332 n. 2 (10th 
Cir.1994). 
**3 As a preliminary matter, we address the 
government's assertion we lack jurisdiction to 
consider Mr. Peach's claims related to his 
convictions on Counts I, III, and IV because his 
notice of appeal was untimely. The government's 
argument is wholly without merit. A notice of 
appeal must be filed within ten days of the entry of 
the judgment appealed from. Fed. R.App. P. 4(b). 
For the purposes of Fed. R.App. P. 4(b), a judgment 
is entered "when it is entered on the criminal 
docket." Id. Although the judgment on Counts I, 
III, and IV was filed January 30, 1996, it was 
entered on the criminal docket sheet on January 31, 
1996. Therefore, Mr. Peach's February 12, 1996, 
filing of a notice of appeal was timely. See Fed. 
R.App. P. 26(a) ("The last day of the period so 
computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, 
a Sunday, or a legal holiday, ... in which event the 
period runs until the end of the next day which is 
not one of the aforementioned days."). [FN2] 
FN2. This appeal was docketed as No. 
96-3054 and dismissed for lack of finality 
on August 26, 1996, by a jurisdictional 
panel of this court. 
I. 
Mr. Peach contends that at the October 1995 trial 
on Counts MV:(a) the district court erred in 
allowing Detective Fettke to testify as an expert on 
crack cocaine sales and differences between drug 
dealers and simple drug users, and (b) the district 
court prejudiced his defense and denied him his 
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by permitting 
Detective Fettke to testify regarding a conversation 
Detective Fettke had with him in December 1994. 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim 




Mr. Peach contends the district court erred in 
allowing Detective Fettke to testify as an expert 
witness. "The determination of whether expert 
testimony should be admitted rests with the sound 
discretion of the [district] court." United States v. 
Esch, 832 F.2d 531, 535 (10th Cir.1987), cert, 
denied, 485 U.S. 908 (1988). Therefore, we defer 
to the district court and review its determination 
only for abuse of that discretion. Id. 
At the first trial in October, 1995, Detective Fettke 
testified as an expert witness on crack cocaine sales 
and the differences between crack cocaine users, 
user-dealers, and dealers based on his training and 
experience in the sale of narcotics. [FN3] Detective 
Fettke testified to his extensive training and 
experience in drug sales during his eleven years 
with the Wichita Police Department. Thereafter, 
he testified the "normal" crack cocaine user only 
possesses: one $20 "rock" of crack cocaine, which 
weighs approximately 0.10 grams; a crack pipe; 
and a lighter or a torch to provide the high heat 
necessary to vaporize the cocaine. Detective 
Fettke testified users usually do not carry more than 
$20-$40 with them and usually do not cany 
firearms for protection. He testified a user 
normally only carries firearms to be pawned or 
traded for cocaine. Finally, Detective Fettke 
testified crack cocaine users usually do not have any 
money or any valuable possessions, because they 
spend all their money on and trade all their 
possessions for more cocaine. 
FN3. Although the district court did not 
formally accept Detective Fettke as an 
expert witness, the court knew the 
prosecution offered him as an expert 
witness, heard him describe his 
qualifications and then allowed him to give 
his opinion testimony. We therefore 
assume the court accepted Detective Fettke 
as an expert witness. See United States v. 
McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1522 n. 2 (10th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 897 (1991). 
In regard to user-dealers, Detective Fettke testified 
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user-dealers often carry firearms with them; 
occasionally have pagers to make them more 
accessible to their buyers; and normally do not 
carry their crack pipes and drug usage paraphernalia 
with them. He noted user-dealers usually have 
"some of the nicer things that go along with dealing 
cocaine." 
**4 The proper inquiry concerning expert 
testimony is whether the jury is able to understand 
the evidence without the specialized knowledge 
available from the testimony of the expert witness. 
United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d at 1522. In 
this case, the basic facts were the amount of crack 
cocaine found in plastic baggies, 1.41 and 1.19 
grams, coupled with the possession of loaded 
firearms, pagers, and over $100 in cash. Without 
understanding the drug trade and how a drug dealer 
works, a jury could not be expected to understand 
the significance of this evidence. McDonald, 933 
F.2d at 1522. Detective Fettke provided the 
specialized knowledge needed to understand the 
evidence presented. Therefore, we hold the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
Detective Fettke to testify as an expert witness. 
b. 
Mr. Peach asserts the district court prejudiced his 
defense and denied him his Sixth Amendment right 
to a fair trial by permitting Detective Fettke, over 
Mr. Peach's objections, to testify regarding a 
conversation Detective Fettke had with him in 
December 1994. 
During the government's case-in-chief, the 
government called Detective Fettke to testify that 
Mr. Peach told him he "does not distribute or use 
crack cocaine." Detective Fettke's testimony was 
presented to refute Mr. Peach's defense that he was 
a simple user of cocaine and not a dealer. The 
district court found this testimony relevant and 
concluded its probative value was not outweighed 
by the prejudice to Mr. Peach. Immediately 
following Detective Fettke's testimony, the district 
court instructed the jury that the testimony could 
only be used for the purpose of determining whether 
Mr. Peach possessed the necessary intent to 
distribute crack cocaine and not for the purpose of 
whether Mr. Peach was engaged in an illegal 




transaction when the conversation took place. 
"We review both the district court's determination 
of the relevancy of the evidence and its conclusion 
that the probative value of the evidence is not 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect for 
an abuse of discretion." United States v. Flanagan, 
34 F.3d 949, 952 (10th Cir.1994). 
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that 
relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without 
the evidence." Mr. Peach did not dispute his 
possession of 1.41 and 1.19 grams of crack cocaine 
on December 18, 1994, and February 7, 1995, 
respectively. Rather, his defense centered on his 
being a simple user of crack cocaine and not a 
distributor. Therefore, Detective Fettke's testimony 
was relevant to Mr. Peach's intent to use or to 
distribute the crack cocaine in his possession. 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides relevant 
evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." The evidence here was certainly 
damaging to Mr. Peach's defense: it refuted his 
assertions that he was a simple user of crack 
cocaine and not a dealer, and it showed additional 
involvement with the police. However, it did not 
rise to the level of unfair prejudice. "[T]he unfair 
prejudice aspect of Rule 403 'cannot be equated 
with testimony which is simply unfavorable to a 
party. It must be unfair in the sense that it would 
be misleading and not aid and assist the jury in 
making a material determination in the case.' " 
Flanagan, 34 F.3d at 953 (quoting McEwen v. City 
of Norman, 926 F.2d 1539, 1549-50 (10th Cir.1991) 
). Accordingly, we hold the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting Detective Fettke's 
testimony regarding the conversation he had with 
Mr. Peach in December 1994. 
II. 
**5 Mr. Peach contends there was insufficient 
evidence to support his convictions on Counts I and 
III for possession of crack cocaine with intent to 
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
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Mr. Peach asserts he is merely a user of cocaine, not 
a distributor. 
To obtain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 
for possession with intent to distribute crack 
cocaine, the government must establish Mr. Peach 
(1) possessed crack cocaine; (2) knew he possessed 
crack cocaine; and (3) intended to distribute the 
crack cocaine. See United States v. Wilson, 107 
F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir.1997). Mr. Peach does not 
claim he did not knowingly possess crack cocaine. 
Mr. Peach challenges the sufficiency of the 
evidence to establish he intended to distribute the 
crack cocaine rather than use it personally. 
We review the record for sufficiency of the 
evidence de novo. Wilson, 107 F.3d at 778. " 
'Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a 
reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, given the direct and 
circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable 
inferences therefrom, taken in a light most favorable 
to the government.' " Id. (quoting United States v. 
Mains, 33 F.3d 1222, 1227 (10th Cir.1994)). 
"Rather than examining the evidence in 'bits and 
pieces,1 we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence 
by 'considering] the collective inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence as a whole.' " Wilson, 107 
F.3d at 778 (quoting United States v. Hooks, 780 
F.2d 1526, 1532 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 
1128 (1986)). Thus, we must affirm the conviction 
if the "collective inferences" from the totality of the 
evidence could have led a reasonable jury to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Peach intended 
to distribute the crack cocaine he possessed. 
In reviewing the record, we hold there was 
sufficient evidence to establish Mr. Peach's intent to 
distribute the crack cocaine found in his possession 
on December 18, 1994, and February 7, 1995. The 
evidence demonstrated: Mr. Peach possessed 1.41 
and 1.19 grams of crack cocaine on December 18, 
1994, and February 7, 1995, respectively; he did 
not have with him any paraphernalia associated with 
drug use on either occasion; on February 7, 1995, 
he was carrying $168 in cash on his person; on 
both occasions, he possessed at least one pager; 
and on both occasions he possessed a loaded 
firearm. Considering the expert testimony of 
Detective Fettke, evidence indicates intent to 
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distribute crack cocaine. Furthermore, this court 
has indicated the presence of firearms in connection 
with drugs, as with the two firearms in this case, 
may be probative evidence of an intent to distribute 
the drugs. See United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 
883, 888 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 506 U.S. 964 
(1992). Taken as a whole, the evidence was 
sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Peach possessed crack 
cocaine with the intent to distribute. 
m. 
**6 Mr. Peach contends the district court erred in 
failing to give an aiding and abetting instruction on 
Counts I through IV. Mr. Peach argues that in order 
for the jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt 
all elements of the offenses charged must be given 
to the jury and, thus, failing to give an aiding and 
abetting instruction as charged in the indictment is 
per se reversible error, especially when the 
evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
support the charges of aiding and abetting in the 
indictment. Mr. Peach asserts the district court 
constructively amended the indictment by omitting 
the aiding and abetting charges from its reading of 
the indictment to the jury and from its jury 
instructions. [FN4] 
FN4. From the record before us, we cannot 
discern whether the district court actually 
read the redacted indictment to the jury in 
addition to submitting a written copy to the 
jury in the jury instructions. However, the 
distinction is irrelevant to our analysis. Our 
holding would be the same whether the 
district court read the redacted indictment 
to the jury, simply allowed the jury to have 
a copy thereof in the jury instructions, or 
both. 
Because Mr. Peach did not object to the district 
court's omitting the aiding and abetting instruction, 
we review only for plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) 
. See United States v. DeSantiago-Flores, 107 
F.3d 1472, 1479 (10th Cir.1997). "Plain error is 
one that 'affects the defendant's right to a fair and 
impartial trial.' " United States v. Galbraith, 20 
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F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir.) (quoting United States 
v. Smith, 13 F.3d 1421, 1424 (10th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 513 U.S. 878 (1994)), cert denied, 513 
U.S. 889 (1994). "It must have been both 'obvious 
and substantial.' " Id. at 1057 (quoting Smith, 13 
F.3datl424). 
In this case, the district court's omission of the 
aiding and abetting charges from the reading of the 
indictment to the jury and from the jury instructions 
ensured Mr. Peach received a fair trial as he was the 
only person charged in the indictment. Therefore, 
there can be no error in the district court's actions. 
Next, Mr. Peach is correct that the jury must find a 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all 
elements of the offense charged. See Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993) (a criminal 
conviction must rest upon a jury determination that 
the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of 
each element of the offense charged). However, 
aiding and abetting is a separate offense with its 
own elements under 18 U.S.C. § 2, and not an 
element of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession with 
intent to distribute a controlled substance, or of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), using or carrying a firearm 
during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. 
See Wilson, 107 F.3d at 778 (discussing elements of 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)); United States v. Ruth, 100 
F.3d 111, 112-13 (10th Cir.1996) (discussing 
elements of § 924(c)(1)); United States v. Yost, 24 
F.3d 99, 104 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing elements 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2). Therefore, a court need not 
instruct a jury on aiding and abetting in order to 
instruct on all the elements of possession with intent 
to distribute or using or carrying a firearm during 
and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. In 
fact, it would be error for the district court to allow 
an aiding and abetting instruction simply because 
the charge was included in the indictment where, as 
in this case, the evidence presented at trial does not 
support such a charge. See United States v. Martin, 
747 F.2d 1404, 1407-08 (11th Cir. 1984). 
**7 Finally, we review whether the district court 
constructively amended the indictment by omitting 
the aiding and abetting instruction. 
A constructive amendment occurs "if the 
evidence presented at trial, together with the jury 
instructions, raises the possibility that the 
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defendant was convicted of an offense other than 
that charged in the indictment." "The specific 
inquiry is whether the jury was permitted to 
convict the defendant upon 'a set of facts 
distinctly different from that set forth in the 
indictment.'" 
Galbraith, 20 F.3d at 1058 (quoting Hunter v. 
New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir.1990), 
cert, denied, 500 U.S. 909 (1991)). 
The key to constructive amendment is the 
defendant's conviction of an offense not charged in 
the indictment. Since it is impossible for the jury 
to have convicted Mr. Peach on a charge which was 
not even presented to them, the district court's 
omission of the aiding and abetting charges did not 
constructively amend the indictment. If anything, 
the district court's omissions amounted to a 
judgment of acquittal on the aiding and abetting 
charges. 
IV. 
Mr. Peach contends the district court lacked 
jurisdiction to prosecute him under the Hobbs Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1951, for the April 10, 1995, robbery 
of Jimmie's Diner. Mr. Peach asserts the 
government "seized" his case from Kansas 
authorities in violation of his civil and constitutional 
rights. Finally, Mr. Peach argues the government 
selectively prosecuted him. [FN5] We review 
challenges to jurisdiction de novo. F.D.I.C. v. 
Hulsey, 22 F.3d 1472,1479 (10th Cir.1994). 
FN5. He also perfunctorily asserts the 
district court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over him. Because he fails to develop this 
issue, we decline to review this claim. 
Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389 n. 
2 (10th Cir.1994). 
"The Hobbs Act provides for the punishment of 
anyone who 7/i any way or degree obstructs, delays, 
or affects commerce or the movement of any article 
or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion 
or attempts or conspires so to do.' " United States 
v. Zeigler, 19 F.3d 486, 489 (10th Cir.) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 1951(a)), cert denied, 513 U.S. 1003 
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(1994) (emphasis in original). Under the Act, 
commerce includes " 'all commerce between any 
point in a State, ... and any point outside thereof; ... 
and all other commerce over which the United 
States has jurisdiction.' " Id (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
1951(b)(3)). 
"Consistent with this broad statutory language, ... 
the 'jurisdictional predicate of the Hobbs Act can be 
satisfied by a showing of "any de minimis effect on 
commerce." ' " United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 
396, 398 (10th Cir.1995) (quoting Zeigler, 19 F.3d 
at 489), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 966 (1996). "In 
order to establish the requisite de minimis effect on 
commerce, the government need only produce 
evidence establishing that the assets of a business 
engaged in interstate commerce were depleted 
during the commission of the crime." Id. 
During the trial on Count V, the Hobbs Act charge, 
the government presented evidence establishing that 
the robbery of Jimmie's Diner depleted the assets of 
business engaged in interstate commerce. 
Specifically, the government demonstrated the 
money taken in the robbery would have been used 
to purchase supplies for the diner from Wonder 
Hostess in St. Louis, Missouri; Milani Foods in 
Charlotte, North Carolina; Mid-Central/SYSCO in 
Kansas City, Missouri; and Meadow Gold in 
Dallas, Texas. This evidence is sufficient to 
demonstrate a de minimis effect on interstate 
commerce under the Hobbs Act. See Bolton, 68 
F.3d at 399; Zeigler, 19 F.3d at 491-93. 
Therefore, we hold the district court had 
jurisdiction to prosecute Mr. Peach for violating the 
Hobbs Act. 
**8 Finally, Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b)(1) requires a 
defendant to raise "objections based on defects in 
the institution of the prosecution" prior to trial. "A 
selective prosecution claim clearly qualifies as such 
an objection." United States v. Bryant, 5 F.3d 474, 
476 (10th Cir.1993). Furthermore, Fed.R.Crim.P. 
12(f) presumes these objections are waived if they 
are not raised prior to trial; a presumption which 
can be overcome with a showing of cause. The 
record in this case indicates Mr. Peach failed to 
raise selective prosecution prior to trial and he 
failed to show cause for this untimeliness. 
Accordingly, Mr. Peach's selective prosecution 
claim is waived. 
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. 
Peach's convictions and sentences on all counts. 
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